In order to resolve the obvious linguistic conflict, the Tribunal found that a violation could, on the whole, be a means of invoking a patent holder. Or a violation may be part of an infringement claim that requires one or more patent claims to cover an offending product. The court narrowly interpreted the first use of the „violation“: Cooper does not recognize that the subject`s products are covered by the subject`s patents. However, the court has largely interpreted the second use of the „violation“: Cooper reserves the right to defend himself in a breach action against Kenall. The Tribunal interpreted the third use of the „violation“ narrowly and as an exclusion from the second warrant: Cooper may defend himself in the context of an infringement proceeding, but cannot result in a specific defence of validity, enforceable force or violation. The court found that this meant that Cooper could not argue that the subject`s products are not covered by the subject`s patents, commonly known as the non-counterfeiting defence. According to the court, Cooper instructed not to defend the non-violation in a infringement action that asserted the subject patents against the subject`s products. It should be noted that the discussion focused solely on whether agreements restrict competition. In the areas of Generics (UK), AG Kokott and the ECJ have made a series of observations on an „effect“ analysis of patent comparison agreements and found that a strategy of concluding several of these agreements could also constitute an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 of the EUF. While it is still open to the companies concerned to demonstrate pro-competitive effects, which are so significant that they raise doubts as to whether the agreement is causing sufficient harm to competition, the judgment does not contain clear guidelines on the circumstances in which this might be the case. Patent comparison agreements as a restriction of competition „aim“? AG Kokott reiterated the ECJ`s assertion in Generics (United Kingdom) that a patent comparison agreement would limit competition if the transfer of value from the patent holder to the generic drug manufacturer had no other explanation than the common economic interest of the parties not to compete on the merits. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the „only consideration“ for the transfer is the requirement for the generic drug manufacturer not to enter the market. If this is the case, it indicates that it is not its perception of the strength of the patent, but the prospect of a transfer of value that has led the generic drug manufacturer to refrain from entering the market.