On-site inspection of suspicious sites to determine if a nuclear explosion has occurred is included in the contract as a final inspection measure. As a general proposal, on-site inspection is the most politically sensitive form of verification, which involves the physical presence on the sovereign territory of a state, in this case under conflicting conditions. Every State party has the right to request an on-the-spot check. The provisions for on-site inspection, both in Article 4 and in the protocol, are extensive and detailed. An application may be based on information derived from the IMS or national technical controls (for example. B remote sensing satellites for monitoring activities or reconnaissance aircraft), or both. A request for a special inspection cannot be based on information gathered by espionage. However, before an on-site inspection can be carried out, 30 of the 51 members of the Executive Board must vote in favour of approving the measure. The inspection should be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible to protect the national security interests of the State party inspected and may include controlled access measures (i.e. freedom of access in the inspection area for the protection of sensitive facilities and confidential information that is not related to the purpose of the inspection). Frivolous or abusive requests entail costs to the requesting state, which range from the payment of the costs incurred by the ECTTO in carrying out the audit to the performance of the activity within the Executive Board. The Treaty also invites States to consult on issues relating to possible violations before resorting to on-site inspection procedures. Currently, the U.S.
government supports the IMS and the IDC, but not the development of field inspection functions. This reflects the government`s view that the IMS is an independent complement to U.S. information and information on potential nuclear tests, while on-site inspection is a contract-specific activity that it does not currently support. 1. Storage adequacy refers to confidence in nuclear deterrence in situations where deterrence (the ability to inflict such overwhelming damage and pain to prevent a potential aggressor from accessing it) is still considered a safety powerhouse. Critics have argued that without nuclear tests, the United States would not be able to maintain its nuclear know-how or guarantee the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpiles, and that, under these conditions, it would not be able to maintain the necessary confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Similarly, those who depend on increased deterrence from the United States could lose confidence in their security guarantees and, in some circumstances, review their non-proliferation obligations.